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Moral Responsibility for Climate Change Loss and 
Damage: A Response to the Excusable Ignorance 
Objection 
 
Laura García-Portela 
 
 
RESUMEN 
El Principio de ‘Los contaminadores pagan’ (PCP, en inglés Polluter Pays Principle 
(PPP)) establece que los contaminadores deben cargar con los costes asociados a su con-
taminación. Este principio ha sido muy polémico porque parece difícil considerar a los 
agentes contaminantes responsables de buena parte de sus emisiones. El PCP se enfrenta 
a la llamada objeción de la ignorancia excusada, que establece que los contaminadores 
fueron por un largo periodo de tiempo ignorantes (de una forma no negligente) acerca de 
las consecuencias negativas de sus emisiones y, por tanto, no pueden ser considerados 
moralmente responsables de ellas. Este artículo se centra en el concepto de responsabili-
dad moral tal y como aparece en la objeción de la ignorancia excusada. En él defiendo 
que esta objeción surge de una noción estrecha de responsabilidad moral y que una no-
ción más fundamental de responsabilidad moral allana el camino para superarla. Aquí 
muestro que debería estar fuera de cuestión que los contaminadores deben cargar con al-
gunos de los costes asociados con sus emisiones. La cuestión relevante es qué costes se 
les puede legítimamente exigir que asuman. Mi argumento es que esta noción fundamen-
tal de responsabilidad moral nos permite asignarles deberes de reparación simbólica, los 
cuales son centrales en las políticas de ‘daños y pérdidas’. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: ‘daños y pérdidas’, principio de ‘Los contaminadores pagan’, responsabilidad mo-
ral, ignorancia excusada, reparación simbólica.  
 
ABSTRACT  
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) states that polluters should bear the burdens as-
sociated with their pollution. This principle has been highly contested because of the pu-
tative impossibility of considering individuals morally responsible for an important 
amount of their emissions. For the PPP faces the so-called excusable ignorance objec-
tion, which states that polluters were for a long time non-negligently ignorant about the 
negative consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, cannot be considered 
morally responsible for their negative consequences. This paper focuses on the concept 
of moral responsibility as it appears in the excusable ignorance objection. I claim that this 
objection stems from a narrow notion of moral responsibility and that a more fundamen-
tal notion of moral responsibility would pave the way to overcome it. I show that it 
should be out of the question whether historical polluters should bear some burdens asso-
ciated with climate change because of their historical emissions. The relevant question is 
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which kind of burdens they can legitimately be asked to bear. I argue that this notion of 
moral responsibility allows us to assign burdens of symbolic reparation, which are at the 
core of ‘Loss and Damage’ policies. 
 
KEYWORDS: ‘Loss and Damage’, Polluter Pays Principle, Moral Responsibility, Excusable Ignorance, 
Symbolic Reparation.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent discourses on climate justice and climate change policy have 
focused on loss and damage as distinctive climate change related burdens 
to be distributed among international agents [Huq, Roberts, and Fenton 
(2013); UNFCCC (2012); Frankhauser, Dietz, and Gradwell (2014)]. 
Over decades, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiations and philosophical debates were focused 
primarily on measures of mitigation (the prevention of future climate 
change by reducing the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG) and the enhancement of carbon sinks) and adaptation (the ad-
justment of populations to the already existent and foreseeable negative 
effects of climate change). However, these two do not exhaust the ac-
tions that are required as a matter of justice in response to the adverse 
effects of climate change. ‘Loss and damage’ measures refer to actions 
that must be undertaken when individuals suffer permanent losses or se-
vere impairments to the goods and services essential for their lives due to 
the effects of climate change. An example of this is the case of sea levels 
rising to the point that seawalls cannot prevent an island from sinking 
and, consequently, its population being forced to migrate.  
Some debates on climate justice revolve around the burden-sharing 
debate, that is, the debate about how to determine burdens associated 
with combatting and responding to climate change. To do so, different 
moral principles are weighed against each other to determine who should 
pay which of the burdens associated with climate change. This paper is 
focused on how to distribute a specific kind of burdens associated with 
‘Loss and Damage’ policies, namely, burdens of symbolic reparation. By 
symbolic reparation, I refer here to those aspects of losses and damages 
that have value beyond material or monetary reparations (non-economic 
losses and damages). Non-economic losses and damages affect, for in-
stance, the self-respect and sense of pride of victims, their freedom of 
cultural self-determination, or their relationships of trust with other 
communities. 
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In this paper, I argue that historical emitters should bear the burdens of 
symbolic reparation that are part of ‘Loss and Damage’ measures.1 I do 
so by defending the Polluter Pays Principle (hereafter, PPP) against the 
excusable ignorance objection. The upshot of my argument will be that 
historical emitters owe duties of symbolic reparation to victims of cli-
mate change even if they cannot be considered culpable for their historical 
emissions. For this purpose, I challenge two presuppositions that under-
lie the excusable ignorance objection. First, I challenge a volitionist notion 
of moral responsibility. Second, I challenge a straightforwardly economi-
cally loaded idea of what might be owed to victims of climate change. In 
contrast to this, I will show, first, that a more inclusive non-volitionist 
notion of moral responsibility would pave the way to supporting the 
PPP, and second, that the excusable ignorance objection does not invali-
date every burden that can be allocated to historical emitters due to his-
torical emissions. The objection might be adequate when it comes to 
allocating straightforward compensatory payments, but this does not rule 
out the validity of other kinds of moral demands. I will argue that a non-
volitionist notion of moral responsibility allows us to assign symbolic du-
ties, which are at the core of ‘Loss and Damage’, to historical emitters. 
Whether or not they should bear additional burdens will depend on oth-
er variables that I will not explore in this paper. 
 
II. THE PPP, THE EXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OBJECTION AND THE 
NARROW VOLUNTARIST CONCEPT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The PPP can be defined in different ways. Usually, the principle is 
described in an economically loaded manner as stating that polluters 
should pay for the negative consequences of climate change in proportion 
to the pollution caused by them [Shue (1999); Neumayer (2000)]. I will 
work here with a more general – and less economically loaded – reading of 
the principle. According to this description, the PPP states that those 
who contributed to climate change by emitting GHG emissions should 
bear the burdens associated with its adverse effects in proportion to their 
contribution. This description of the PPP is more inclusive insofar as it 
makes room for burdens that are not necessarily economic.  
The PPP faces a number of objections. My focus here will be the 
so-called excusable ignorance objection. The excusable ignorance objection al-
lows for at least two different readings, which are intimately related but 
must be distinguished. First, the excusable ignorance objection can be in-
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terpreted as addressing attributions of moral responsibility in general 
(MR version). According to this reading, the objection states that an agent 
should not be considered morally responsible for the harmful conse-
quences of his actions if they could not have known or foreseen them at 
the time his action took place. Second, the objection can be interpreted 
as addressing liability for economic costs. According to this reading, the 
objection states that no one can be made to bear economic burdens for 
something caused under excusable ignorance circumstances (LEC ver-
sion). The reason behind this is that no one can be made worse off for 
circumstances that were not under their control. Demanding compensa-
tion from someone for losses and damages caused in a non-negligent 
way would, in fact, make them unfairly economically worse off. 
Both versions of the objection imply the same conclusion concern-
ing pre-1990 GHG emissions. As is generally agreed [Gosseries (2004); 
Bell (2011); Moellendorf (2014)], before the publication of the first In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report in 1990 agents 
could have not been expected to know about the negative consequences 
of releasing massive amounts of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. 
Thus, those that emitted GHG emissions were non-culpably ignorant. 
Following the objection, they cannot be considered morally responsible 
(MR version), and/or they cannot be made liable for the economic costs as-
sociated with the negative consequences of those emissions (LEC version). 
My argument starts with a criticism of the notion of moral respon-
sibility that underlies the two versions of the excusable ignorance objec-
tion. The excusable ignorance objection assumes a volitionist notion of 
moral responsibility. That is, it requires that the agent acted voluntarily. 
This is suggested by the idea that, for being morally responsible, the agent 
must have been aware of the consequences of their actions or must have 
at least had the open possibility of knowing them.2 Absent this epistemic 
condition, moral responsibility cannot be assigned on the basis of histor-
ical emissions. I assume that what makes advocates of excusable igno-
rance reject the attribution of responsibility for pre-1990 emissions to 
historical emitters is conditioned on volitionist compromises regarding 
moral responsibility. In the next section, I argue that it is possible to use 
a different and more fundamental notion of moral responsibility that 
does not rest on voluntarist conditions. This notion is thus immune to 
the excusable ignorance objection, at least for what concerns certain cli-
mate change-related burdens.  
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III. RESPONSIBILITY AS ANSWERABILITY: A FUNDAMENTAL NOTION 
OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Angela Smith (2008, 2015) has proposed an understanding of moral 
responsibility as a single and unified concept that underlies our attributions 
of moral responsibility. She calls this notion ‘responsibility as answerabil-
ity’. In her words, responsibility as answerability works as follows: 
 
To say that an agent is morally responsible for something is to say that 
that agent is an appropriate target, in principle, of request for justification re-
garding that thing and that she is eligible, in principle, for a variety of moral re-
sponses depending upon how well or poorly she meets the justificatory request’ [Smith, 
(2015), p. 103]. 
 
According to this definition, attributions of moral responsibility are ap-
propriate when two conditions are met. First, the agent must be eligible 
for demands of justification regarding her action. Second, her action 
must concern her moral relationship with others, such that it would 
make sense for them to hold certain moral attitudes in response to her 
action depending on how well she meets the justificatory requirement. 
To explain the first requirement, Smith compares her definition of 
moral responsibility with what she calls ‘superficial’ assessments (Smith 
2008). Superficial assessments are the kind of assessments that have no 
moral dimensions at all. For example, let us imagine that someone goes 
to the doctor because they are experiencing some vision problems. The 
doctor assesses their vision with a vision test that they happen to fail. 
According to Smith’s account, the results delivered by the test constitute 
a paradigmatic example of a superficial assessment because it represents 
a merely descriptive assessment and does not involve any kind of moral 
evaluation of the agent. 
It bears noting that the fundamental reason why those results can-
not lead to any attribution of fault or blame is that it would make no 
sense to ask that person for the reasons underlying her performance. 
Moral responsibility applies only to those behaviors that, in a rational 
creature, are or should be ‘under the control of reason’ [Scanlon (1998), 
p. 272]. ‘Superficial’ assessments describe features of individuals that just 
happen to them or, in Scanlon’s words, features that ‘visit them’. This al-
so applies to individual actions when they are caused by external physical 
forces. The aforementioned remarks suggest that there is a fundamental 
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difference between ‘superficial’, morally meaningless attributions of fault, 
and valid attributions of moral responsibility. This difference concerns 
the plausibility of asking for the reasons that underlie the agent’s actions. 
There is yet another condition to be met for attributions of moral re-
sponsibility: It must make sense for others to have certain kinds of moral 
responses to the agents’ actions. Or, in other words, the kind of moral crit-
icism attached to moral responsibility ‘must have a particular kind of sig-
nificance for the agent’s relation to other people’ [Scanlon (1998), p. 276]. 
These responses will vary depending on how well the agent meets the jus-
tificatory requirement. Scanlon explains this second characteristic by 
comparing moral criticism with rational criticism. Rational criticism 
merely concerns one’s ability to apply certain kinds of rational proce-
dures to an activity. One can be rationally criticized for errors in mathe-
matical reasoning, spelling, or chess based on a mistaken application of 
certain rational procedures. Moral criticism, in contrast, concerns our re-
lations with other people and what we owe to each other. In Smith’s 
words: ‘The special significance of moral as opposed to other forms of 
rational criticism, then, is that it concerns the quality of our relations 
with others rather than the quality of our activity in some other norma-
tive domain’ [Smith (2015), p. 120]. 
 
IV. ELIGIBILITY FOR JUSTIFICATION AND MORAL RESPONSES FOR 
HISTORICAL EMISSIONS 
 
In this section, I argue that historical emitters comply with the 
aforementioned conditions of moral responsibility. I do so by elaborat-
ing on the idea that being ‘eligible for justifications’ depends on whether 
an agent can be considered to have acted, in Scanlon’s words, ‘under the 
control of reason’. I interpret this condition to be met when an agent 
acts deliberatively (or should have acted deliberatively), that is, weighing 
reasons in favor and against the action at stake. I argue that this is a suf-
ficient condition to make someone eligible for demands of justification 
regarding the consequences of his actions. If, in addition, those actions 
also affect their relationship with others, those agents are also eligible for 
moral responses. 
The excusable ignorance objection relies on the notion of a sharp ep-
istemic threshold. Before a certain cut-off date, emitters are considered ex-
cused for their ignorance concerning the negative impact of their 
emissions. After it, they are or must be aware of the negative conse-
quences of their emitting activities. This interpretation gives us the im-
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pression that before 1990 historical emitters did not know and could not rea-
sonably have known anything about the possible negative consequences of 
their emissions. I consider this interpretation of a ‘sudden realization’ to 
be implausible.  
A more reasonable interpretation of the underlying rationale behind 
the excusable ignorance objection would be the following. Up to 1990, 
agents could not have been expected to have the obligation to modify 
their emitting behavior because their ‘pro-emitting reasons’ overrode 
‘pro-mitigation reasons’ stemming from scientific uncertainty regarding 
the effects of GHG emissions. Before 1990, they did have reasons (may-
be even good reasons) to continue emitting GHGs. The benefits coming 
from their emissions-generating activities allowed them to boost their 
social, political and economic development. When weighing the benefits 
of their activities against their only possible negative consequences, emit-
ters might have had good reasons to carry on emitting until 1990. How-
ever, the fact that they weighed (or should have weighed) those 
conflicting reasons is what makes their decision to continue emitting a 
deliberative action. 
The question now is whether historical emitters acted, or could 
have acted, in such a way. A key issue is whether they suspected, or had 
reasons to suspect, that their activities had unknown, underexplored, or 
even possible dangerous consequences. When approaching this question, 
we should, once again, steer clear of the ‘all-or-nothing’ narrative of the 
excusable ignorance objection. It is enough to prove that at early stages 
historical emitters acted, or should have acted, against a background of 
conflicting reasons regarding the adequacy of basing their development 
on the burning of fossil fuels.  
Historical data speaks in favor of this hypothesis, suggesting that 
historical emitters went through various stages of realization from total 
ignorance to high scientific certainty regarding the negative consequenc-
es of GHG emissions. Awareness of the potential effects of GHG emis-
sions dates back to at least 1896, when Svante Arrhenius published the 
first scientific study describing the GHG effect and the yet-unknown 
consequences of industrialization. In 1899, Thomas C. Chamberlin fur-
ther developed the idea that changes in climate could result from chang-
es in CO2 concentration. In 1938, Guy S. Callendar recovered Arrhenius’ 
ideas about the GHG effect. He presented scientific data that showed a 
correlation between rises in temperature and CO2 level in the atmos-
phere, and measurements about the capacity of that gas to absorb radia-
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tion. This evidence was even more significant if we consider that the ef-
fects of the local environmental impacts of pollution were well-known 
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution [Zellentin (2015)]. Fur-
thermore, political awareness of the critical situation was already evident 
at least since the early 1960s. In 1965, the president of the US Lyndon B. 
Johnson reported to Congress that ‘this generation has altered the com-
position of the atmosphere on a global scale through … a steady increase 
in carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels (…); large-scale pollu-
tion of air … is no respecter of political boundaries, and its effects ex-
tend far beyond those who cause it; the longer we wait to act, the greater 
the dangers and the larger the problem’.3 Thus, as Stephen Gardiner sug-
gests, a better approach would be to embrace a more sophisticated his-
torical understanding that acknowledges an evolution of awareness over 
time [Gardiner (2016)]. 
Historical data supports the claim that historical emitters did make 
or should have made a deliberative choice. They chose not to invest 
more in research before continuing with rising emissions, or not to give 
up emission-generating activities as a driver for their development. They 
even could have had good reasons not to do so. Even if they weighed 
the reasons available to them in an adequate way, they should be consid-
ered the agents of their actions. This is what makes them ‘an appropriate 
target, in principle, of a request for justification’ regarding the conse-
quences of their activities. Arguing to the contrary would lead us to treat 
historical emissions as if those actions just ‘happened to’ or ‘visited’ his-
torical emitters. That would imply treating the actions of historical emit-
ters and their devastating climate change consequences as equivalent to 
natural variability or natural disasters. This, in my view, would be a rather 
odd view on climate change, since it would ignore a widespread intuition 
concerning the moral significance of its anthropogenic origin. 
The aforementioned conclusion supports the first condition of 
moral responsibility as answerability. What about the second one? We 
should recall that this eligibility for moral responses depends on the fact 
that the agent’s actions affect their relationship with others. I claim that 
this condition is met because emission-generating activities lead to devas-
tating consequences for those most vulnerable to climate change. If 
someone doubts this, it is enough to take a look at how vulnerable coun-
tries of the Global South have pressed industrialized and developed 
countries to bear the burdens of addressing climate change on the basis 
of their historical responsibility. Since the two conditions of moral re-
sponsibility are met for the case of historical emitters, we should con-
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clude that historical emitters are morally responsible for the activities 
that, having high levels of emissions as side-effects, ended up harming 
others.4 
At this point, it is important to bear in mind that the question of 
whether someone is morally responsible for something or not, and the 
question of which moral responses and requests are suitable in light of 
that attribution, belong in two different categories. The first one depends 
only upon the conditions put forward in this section. The second one 
depends upon the nature of the justification provided by those who are 
deemed morally responsible, as well as whether that justification violates 
certain moral norms or expectations [Smith (2015)]. 
Taking the findings of this section into account, let us come back 
to the two versions of the excusable ignorance objection. By now, it 
should be clear that the MR version does not apply because historical 
emitters’ actions comply with the two (non-volitionist) conditions of 
moral responsibility. It is more difficult to conclude that this notion of 
moral responsibility undermines the second version, the LEC version. Un-
like the MR version of the excusable ignorance objection, the LEC version 
refers to a specific response that should be requested from historical 
emitters, namely, economic compensation. It is not immediately clear 
that demanding economic compensation is the adequate response to ac-
tions undertaken under excusable ignorance circumstances. However, as 
I will shortly explain, this does not imply that the notion of moral re-
sponsibility outlined above has no normative and political implications 
whatsoever. They could be asked to bear other kinds of burdens that ac-
commodate the nature of the thing in question, namely, their excusable 
ignorance concerning the conclusiveness of their data about climate 
change. In this vein, I argue that symbolic burdens associated with ‘Loss 
and Damage’ can be allocated on the basis of the concept of moral re-
sponsibility sketched in this section.  
 
V. JUSTIFICATION BASED ON ‘EXCUSABLE IGNORANCE’ AND SUITABLE 
MORAL RESPONSES 
 
My aim in this section is to show that the kind of justification 
brought forward by historical emitters – based on excusable ignorance – 
is neither sufficient to withhold attributions of moral responsibility nor 
to forego requests of moral responses. I argue that excusable ignorance 
still allows for requests of certain kind of reparatory symbolic measures.  
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First, some further words about excusable ignorance. The term ‘ex-
cusable’ in the phrase ‘excusable ignorance’ stems from the premise – 
which I accepted as valid – that agents could not reasonably have known 
about the negative effects of GHG emissions at the time when they 
emitted. It was not the case that they had a clear possibility of getting ac-
cess to that knowledge and negligently overlooked it or that they deliber-
ately ignored clear signals about the consequences of their polluting 
actions. Thus, we can say that historical emitters’ ignorance was non-
negligent. This is the reason why we consider them excused for their igno-
rance. This prompts the question of whether this non-negligent aspect of 
their ignorance leads straightforwardly to withholding every moral de-
mand. In other words, the question is whether, while being excused for 
their ignorance, agents are also excused from every moral request. 
To answer this question, let us consider a paradigmatic case of ex-
cusable ignorance. Bernard Williams presents a scenario involving a ‘lor-
ry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child’ [Williams 
(1981)]. To elaborate on the ‘no-fault claim’, we could imagine the child 
being obscured by a rock and jumping suddenly in front of the lorry 
without the driver having any room to maneuver and avoid running over 
the child. Following the aforementioned analyses, we shall say that the 
lorry driver is eligible for demands of justification regarding how and 
why the accident happened. When facing those demands, the lorry driver 
can, of course, explain that he was non-negligently ignorant. He could 
not have reasonably expected the child to appear all of a sudden and run 
in front of his lorry. Thus, he must be excused for his ignorance con-
cerning the presence and actions of the child. However, it is important to 
notice that, while he is excused for his ignorance, he is not excused from every moral 
demand or request that one could make on him concerning that action. This 
is, I believe, a common misconception in climate justice debates. Of 
course, it makes sense to ask the driver for a justification regarding his 
action and to ensure that he was excusably ignorant. But it also makes 
sense to expect him to regret what happened and express it together with 
his condolences to the child’s family. In my view, these expectations also 
have normative force. That is, we would consider him to act wrongly 
should he not react in such a way. 
I must admit there might still be an unexplained gap between our 
reasonable expectations and their normative force. Although one would 
expect these kinds of reactions from anyone in their right mind, that 
does not necessarily mean that they would have done something wrong 
had they frustrated these expectations. I think that our intuitions regard-
Moral Responsibility for Climate Change Loss and Damage: …                       17 
 
teorema XXXIX/1, 2020, pp. 7-24 
 
ing the case point towards a different direction. Imagine a driver that, 
confronted with the fact that he killed the child, immediately reacts by 
saying that he did not do so voluntarily, that his ignorance was non-
negligent and, thus, that he must be excused. If he reacts in such a way 
without manifesting any kind of agent-regret sentiment, or attempting to 
comfort the family for what happened, we would not just feel that our 
expectations have been frustrated.5 We would also think that there is 
something wrong about his conduct and that he should not have acted in 
that way. This is why we are justified in thinking that our expectations 
regarding the lorry driver’s reaction have an important normative value. 
This hypothetical case suggests that when confronted with an explana-
tion about the consequences of their harmful actions and their moral 
significance, moral agents owe at least a certain kind of symbolic repara-
tion for what they unwittingly did. 
The narrative in which the excusable ignorance objection was de-
veloped seems to point out that there is not a thing we can demand from 
an agent when it comes to actions that were pursued under excusable ig-
norance. This seems to put us in an all-or-nothing position: Either we 
consider someone morally responsible and require them to pay for all the 
costs associated with their action or we withdraw any attribution of mor-
al responsibility and forward-looking demands. My point is that there 
should be something in between. It would, indeed, not be reasonable to 
demand of the lorry driver that he bears the whole costs associated with 
the death of the child, economically, legally, or otherwise, as if he had 
killed the child intentionally or negligently. However, it is also true that it 
would not be a suitable reaction to overlook the fact that the lorry driver 
was prominently involved in the death of the child because ‘there is 
something special about his relation to this happening, something which 
cannot merely be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his 
fault’ [Williams (1981), p. 28]. If we were to ignore this fact, we would be 
treating the child’s death as if it had been caused by the fall of a tree. If 
the distinction between harm caused by natural factors and harm caused 
by human agency is blurred, we would overlook the potential reparative 
significance of the lorry driver’s agent-regret. Given the central signifi-
cance of those responses, we would not be right in thinking that those 
actions are merely to be expected, but rather that they should be de-
manded as suitable moral responses for the loss experienced by the 
child’s family. 
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As I showed in this section, excusable ignorance belongs to the 
kind of extenuating circumstances that demand middle-way responses. 
By its nature, non-negligent ignorance does not invalidate every kind of 
attribution of moral responsibility and every demand of responses to 
those involved in the relevant action. In the next section, I will address 
how the moral requests suitable for this case can be translated into sym-
bolic reparation for climate loss and damage. 
 
 
VI. SYMBOLIC REPARATION FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LOSS AND 
DAMAGE 
 
I said so far that the concept of moral responsibility – in the basic 
sense of answerability – addresses demands of justification from those 
rational agents that, in the course of the development of their rational 
plans, were prominently causally responsible for harmful outcomes that 
affect their relationship with others. I also showed that the nature of the 
justification provided by non-negligent ignorance suffices to excuse peo-
ple for this epistemic status, but not excuse them from every moral re-
quest. Particularly, I have claimed that non-negligent ignorance does not 
preclude agents from bearing duties of symbolic reparation. Now the 
question is: Why should this matter for the debate on how to distribute 
the burdens associated with climate change? 
As I noted at the beginning of this paper, the analysis provided here 
is important for climate loss and damage. ‘Loss and damage’ burdens re-
fer to the actions that must be undertaken when individuals suffer per-
manent losses or temporal severe impairments to the goods and services 
essential for their lives. These measures range from compensatory pay-
ments for climate change losses and damages to ‘measures of satisfac-
tion’ [Burkett (2009), Page and Heyward (2016)]. My focus here is on 
‘measures of satisfaction’ or what can also be called ‘symbolic repara-
tion.’ As I indicated at the beginning of this paper, measures of satisfac-
tion or symbolic reparation address those aspects of losses and damages 
that have value beyond material or monetary reparations (non-economic 
losses and damages). Non-economic losses and damages affect, for in-
stance, the self-respect and sense of pride of victims, their cultural de-
termination, or their relationships of trust with other communities.  
According to the existing literature on climate reparations, satisfac-
tion and symbolic reparation cover a wide range of measures. They usu-
ally go from public apologies to truth-telling initiatives, commemoration, 
Moral Responsibility for Climate Change Loss and Damage: …                       19 
 
teorema XXXIX/1, 2020, pp. 7-24 
 
remembrance, and acknowledgment [Meyer (2006); Burkett (2009); Page 
and Heyward (2016); Heyward (2012)]. While it is true that all of them 
intend to address non-economic losses and damages suffered by victims, 
it is usually not highlighted that they belong to two different categories. 
Satisfaction can be focused on victims (victim-centered) or the perpetra-
tors and their relation to the harm suffered by victims (agent-centered). 
An instance of the first category would be remembrance. In the context 
of climate change, remembrance would refer to actions that ‘enable vic-
tims of climate change injustice to record their story, to recount what 
was lost and its effects upon them’ [Heyward (2012), p. 163]. These 
kinds of measures are victim-centered because their main purpose is the 
preservation of the victims’ history and culture, which might be im-
portant for the sense of identity of members of the affected communi-
ties. In other words, these measures of satisfaction are independent of 
the origin of the harm suffered by the victims, whether it is anthropo-
genic or otherwise. In contrast, agent-centered measures of satisfaction 
acknowledge the origin of the harm. The purpose of these measures is to 
acknowledge the role of the agents in the injustice suffered by the vic-
tims and, eventually, to restore the moral relationship between victims 
and agents. Agent-centered measures include, for instance, apologies, 
statements of (agent-)regret, truth-telling measures, and guarantees of 
non-repetition.6 
The notion of moral responsibility that I put forth here is intended 
to cover losses and damages associated with agent-centered measures of 
satisfaction or symbolic reparation. To see how this can happen, let us 
recall the previous steps of my argument. Historical emitters are answer-
able for their historical emissions for two reasons. First, their actions 
were undertaken ‘under the control of reason’, that is, they were not 
simply something that ‘happened’ or ‘visited’ them. Second, their actions 
affected their relationship with others because they made victims suffer 
the negative effects of climate change. The fulfilment of these two char-
acteristics makes them answerable for their actions. When confronted 
with the demands of answerability, historical emitters can bring up their 
well-justified pre-1990 excusable ignorance. However, as we see in the 
case of Williams’ lorry driver, excusable ignorance does not constitute a 
fully extenuating justification. Historical emitters, as the lorry driver, are 
subjected to requests of symbolic reparation. This means that they ought 
to acknowledge their prominently causal role in the harm suffered by 
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victims of climate change, as well as to provide a public statement of 
agent-regret for their historical contribution to climate change. 
Measures of satisfaction should include two elements. First, an ac-
knowledgment that the victim’s situation is not due to natural variability 
of the climate, but rather a consequence of polluting actions. This explic-
it acknowledgment would mean recognizing that historical emitters are 
morally answerable for what they did. This means acknowledging that 
they, and not others, are the ones eligible to respond for what happened.7 
Recognizing climate change losses and damages as something that has 
anthropogenic origin is what allows us to explain their situation as a par-
ticular type of injustice, as distinguished from cases of ‘tough luck’. The 
second element to be included in measures of satisfaction is a public ex-
pression of agent-regret that aims at the restitution of the moral ties 
among climate change perpetrators and victims. This is due because the 
nature of the justification provided by excusable ignorance does not pre-
clude this kind of symbolic reparation. The same goes for truth-telling 
measures and guarantees of non-repetition [Minow (1998)]. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I strengthened the case for the Polluter Pays Principle 
for distributing the burdens associated with climate change symbolic 
reparations under the framework of ‘Loss and Damage’ policies. I did so 
by challenging a highly relevant objection to the principle: the so-called 
excusable ignorance objection. I proposed a non-volitionist concept of 
moral responsibility that would allow us to consider historical emitters 
morally responsible, in a very fundamental sense, for their historical 
emissions. As I argued, excusable ignorance does not preclude requesting 
symbolic reparations from agents that prominently caused severe harm 
to others. This is the case of historical emitters.  
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NOTES 
 
1 In this paper, I consider states to be the relevant agents: Since we are 
dealing with historical claims, we need to rely on entities that persist over time 
as the relevant agents for bearing the costs associated with climate change. This 
is mostly the case with states. This way of proceeding is not ad-hoc, but rather 
justified due to three factors. First, states are the ontological units at the heart of 
global environmental law and they possess legitimacy in policy areas that con-
cern climate change. Second, states are the agents capable of coordinating ef-
forts to undertake the necessary measures to respond to global climate change 
[Page (2012)]. Third, treating states as the relevant agents is a well-established 
and prevailing practice in international policy and, more specifically, in the con-
text of UNFCCC negotiations. Thus, it would be difficult to image how to deal 
with international problems otherwise [Gardiner (2016)]. Therefore, whenever I 
use terms such as ‘agents’ and ‘historical emitters’ I refer to states.  
2 Drawing on Aristotle (2004), III, 1110a-1111b, a full volitionist account 
of moral responsibility includes a control condition as well as the epistemic 
condition already mentioned. The control condition states that the action at 
stake must have its origin in the agent, that is, that it cannot be compelled exter-
nally. What exactly this control condition means is under dispute. However, 
since what diminishes the voluntariness of the action in the context of historical 
emissions is the epistemic condition and not the control condition, I can remain 
agnostic about how we should understand the control condition. 
3 See: President Lyndon B. Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress on 
Conservation and Restoration of Natural Beauty,” February 8, 1965, Santa Barbara, 
CA: The American Presidency Project, 2015, <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson 
/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650208.asp>. Cit. in Gardiner 2016, pp. 112-113. 
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4 One might object that this does not fit the description under which they 
undertook their actions. When they acted, the description of the action was X 
(and X did not include any harmful consequences). Then, when we formulate 
the question by describing their actions as ‘activities that entailed high levels of 
emissions as side-effects and ended up harming others’ (say, Y), we are asking 
about an action they do not acknowledge as the action they undertook. At that 
time, they would insist, they undertook action X and not action Y. As a reply to 
this, it must be noticed that, on the answerability account, the relevant descrip-
tion of the action is the one that, in principle, affects our moral relationship with 
others, because that is what triggers the answerability mechanism. That descrip-
tion is not X but Y. 
5 The concept of agent-regret was coined by Bernard Williams to draw the 
distinction between the form of regret that belongs to third parties, first-person 
regret, and remorse. For Williams, regret always involves thoughts like ‘how 
much better it would have been if it had been otherwise”. Nonetheless, there is 
a difference between third-party regret and agent-regret. Third-party regret is a 
general regret that can be felt, in principle, by everyone who could have the 
conception of how things might otherwise have been and the consciousness of 
how things would then have been better. In contrast, agent-regret is ‘a species of 
regret which a person can only feel towards his own past actions” [Williams 
(1981)]. This concept of agent-regret is independent from whether these actions 
were undertaken voluntarily or not. Remorse refers, on Williams’ account, to 
agent-regret that applies only to voluntary actions. 
6 It bears noting that some measures can be seen as belonging to both of 
these categories. For instance, acknowledgment can be seen as the acknowl-
edgment of the facts by the perpetrators, but it can also be seen as recognition 
that something of value that belongs to the victims was lost [Heyward (2012)]. 
In this sense, victim-centered and agent-centered can be seen not just as catego-
ries that cover different measures, but also as approaches to each of them. 
7 This does not exclude that others should also respond to that injustice in 
different ways – by victim-centered measures of satisfaction or by providing 
other kind of aid. However, the only ones that should respond for the injustice in 
an answerable sense are emitters. 
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